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STATE OF UTAH 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Protecting Utah • Protecting You 
February 23, 2007 
Ms. Pat Bartholomew 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Supreme Court 
450 South State Street, 5th Floor 
P.O. Box 140210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-0210 
Re: State v. Rhinehart, Case No. 20050635-SC 
Utah R. App. P. 24(j) Supplemental Authority Letter 
Dear Ms. Bartholomew: 
Pursuant to rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State cites State v. 
Grimmett, 2007 UT 11, in support of Point I, pages 12-19, of the State's brief. Grimmett was 
issued by this Court on January 23, 2007, after the State filed its brief. A copy ofGrimmett 
is attached for the Court's convenience. 
The State also wishes to clarify a factual assertion in its brief. On page 18 of its brief, 
the State asserts that in State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681 (Utah 1997), the defendant "did, in fact, 
file a timely motion to withdraw his guilty pleas." The assertion that Taylor filed a timely 
motion to withdraw his pleas was based on counsel's review of the original trial proceedings 
in that case. According to that record, Taylor filed a motion to withdraw his pleas on June 
1, 1991, thirty-one days after he pled guilty. In 1991, June 1 fell on a Saturday. Thus, 
counsel concluded that it was likely that the motion to withdraw had been timely filed, but 
not date-stamped by the court clerk until later. Moreover, at the time Taylor moved to 
withdraw his appeals, no Utah appellate court had held that the statutory time limit for filing 
a motion to withdraw a plea was jurisdictional. See State v. Price, 837 P.2d 578, 581-84 
(Utah 1992), overruled on other grounds by State v. Ostler,2001 UT 68,111,31 P.3d528. 
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Since filing the State's brief in this case, counsel has discovered that a post-conviction 
trial court concluded that Taylor's motion to withdraw his pleas was untimely. On appeal 
from that ruling, Taylor argued that his motion to withdraw was timely under this Court's 
decision in Ostler, 2001 UT 68. See Appellant's Brief at 52 n.19, in Taylor v. State, 2007 
UT 12; Case No. 20040262. This Court recently issued a decision in that appeal, but did not 
address the timeliness of the motion to withdraw. See Taylor v. State, 2007 UT 12, ^ [ 4,18-
22. Rather, the Court merely stated that Taylor moved to withdraw his pleas "[a] month after 
being sentenced," and that the trial court denied the motion. Id. at % 4. The timeliness of 
Taylor's motion to withdraw was ultimately irrelevant to this Court's opinion. See id. at f^ f 
18-22. 
Thus, the timeliness of Taylor's motion to withdraw is debatable. However, as the 
State explained in its brief, the timeliness of Taylor's motion is also ultimately irrelevant to 
the jurisdictional issue in this appeal because neither Taylor opinion addresses the statutory 
time bar or its jurisdictional effect. 
Because oral argument in this appeal is set for next Thursday, March 1, I would 
appreciate it you would promptly distribute this letter and attachment to the Court. 
Sincerely, 
^ L A U R A B. DUPAIX 
Assistant Attorney General 
cc: Elizabeth Hunt, counsel for appellant/defendant 
Westlaw 
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H 
Grimmett v. StateUtah,2007. 
NOTICE: THIS OPINION HAS NOT BEEN 
RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE 
PERMANENT LAW REPORTS. UNTIL 
RELEASED, IT IS SUBJECT TO REVISION OR 
WITHDRAWAL. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
Adolph Ellington GRIMMETT, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
STATE of Utah, Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 20050143. 
Jan. 23, 2007. 
Background: After he pled guilty and was 
convicted of attempted aggravated robbery, 
attempted theft, and assault, defendant filed motion 
for postconviction relief seeking resentencing, and 
motion to withdraw his pleas. The Third District, 
Salt Lake, Bruce C. Lubeck, J., granted motion to 
resentence and denied subsequent motion to 
withdraw pleas. Defendant appealed. The Court of 
Appeals denied motion to summarily reverse or 
order remand hearing and certified appeal for 
transfer. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Parrish, J., held that: 
(1) motion to withdraw pleas was untimely under 
prior version of statute, requiring filing of the 
motion within 30 days of entry of plea, and 
(2) order granting motion for resentencing did not 
provide defendant with renewed opportunity to 
withdraw his guilty plea, under amended version of 
statute. 
Affirmed. 
[1] Criminal Law 110 €^274(9) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XV Pleas 
110k272 Plea of Guilty 
110k274 Withdrawal 
110k274(9) k. Time for Application. 
Most Cited Cases 
The filing limitations that govern a criminal 
defendant's right to withdraw a guilty plea are 
jurisdictional. West's U.C.A. § 77-13-6(2)(b). 
[2] Criminal Law 110 €^1044.1(2) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(E) Presentation and Reservation in 
Lower Court of Grounds of Review 
110XXIV(E)1 In General 
110kl044 Motion Presenting Objection 
110kl044.1 In General; Necessity 
of Motion 
110kl044.1(2) k. Preliminary 
Proceedings; Indictment, Information, or 
Complaint. Most Cited Cases 
Failure to comply with the requirements of the 
statute establishing the filing limitations governing a 
criminal defendant's right to withdraw a guilty plea 
extinguishes a defendant's right to challenge the 
validity of the guilty plea on appeal. West's U.C.A. § 
77-13-6(2)(b). 
[3] Criminal Law 110 €^>274(9) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XV Pleas 
110k272 Plea of Guilty 
110k274 Withdrawal 
110k274(9) k. Time for Application. 
Most Cited Cases 
Motion to withdraw guilty pleas, filed nearly two 
years after entry of the pleas, was untimely, under 
prior version of statute governing limitations for 
filing a motion to withdraw a guilty plea, which 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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required filing of the motion within 30 days after 
entry of the plea. West's U.C.A. § 77-13-6(2)(b). 
[4] Criminal Law 110 €^>274(9) 
110 Criminal Law 
110XV Pleas 
110k272 Plea of Guilty 
110k274 Withdrawal 
110k274(9) k. Time for Application. 
Most Cited Cases 
Trial court's order granting motion for resentencing 
did not provide defendant with a renewed 
opportunity to withdraw his guilty pleas, under 
amended version of statute governing limitations for 
filing motion to withdraw pleas, which required that 
motion to withdraw pleas be filed prior to 
sentencing, and thus motion to withdraw pleas filed 
after motion for resentencing was granted by before 
resentencing was announced was untimely. West's 
U.C.A. §77-13-6(2)(b). 
Elizabeth Hunt, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff. 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Att'y Gen., Jeffrey S. Gray, Asst. 
Att'y Gen., Salt Lake City, for defendant. 
On Certification from the Utah Court of Appeals 
PARRISH, Justice: 
*1 K 1 Plaintiff Adolph Grimmett appeals from a 
denial of his motion to withdraw several guilty 
pleas. The question raised by this appeal stems from 
the intersection of the nunc pro tunc resentencing 
remedy we outlined in State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 
36, 38 (Utah 1981), and Utah Code section 
77-13-6(2)(b), which establishes the time 
limitations governing motions to withdraw. More 
specifically, we must determine whether a 
resentencing order under Johnson extends the time 
during which a defendant may file a motion to 
withdraw under section 77-13-6(2)(b). We conclude 
that it does not and thus affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
*1 \ 2 In December 2002, Grimmert was charged 
by information with aggravated kidnapping, 
attempted automobile theft, assault, and public 
intoxication. The charges arose from an incident at 
the University of Utah during which Grimmert 
attacked a woman as she was getting into her car. 
Grimmett's appointed counsel, Robin Ljungberg, 
advised Grimmert that his ethnicity would 
negatively affect his chances at trial. Ljungberg also 
stated that the high-profile Elizabeth Smart case " 
would have an impact on the jury." Grimmert 
followed Ljungberg's advice and pled guilty to a 
reduced charge of attempted aggravated robbery, 
attempted theft, and assault. The district court 
entered a final judgment in March 2003 and 
sentenced Grimmert to consecutive prison terms of 
varying lengths. 
*1 % 3 Several months later, Grimmert began 
writing letters to the district court complaining that 
Ljungberg had neither filed an appeal nor moved to 
withdraw his guilty pleas, despite his requests that 
Ljungberg do so. Ljungberg confirmed the truth of 
these allegations, but the district court informed 
Grimmert that it lacked jurisdiction to reconsider 
the sentence and advised him to appeal. The district 
court treated Grimmett's fourth letter as a notice of 
appeal. The court of appeals subsequently 
dismissed the appeal in July 2004, citing its 
untimeliness. State v. Grimmett, 2004 UT App 
235U, — P.3d — . 
*1 K 4 In June 2004, two weeks before the court of 
appeals dismissed Grimmett's appeal, his newly 
appointed counsel filed a petition for 
post-conviction relief under the Post-Conviction 
Remedies Act (the "PCRA"), Utah Code Ann. §§ 
78-35a-101 to -110 (2002 & Supp.2006), and rule 
65C of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In his 
petition, Grimmert sought resentencing and 
alternatively moved to withdraw his guilty pleas, 
arguing that they had been involuntary. 
*1 1| 5 The State responded to Grimmett's 
post-conviction petition by agreeing that he should 
be resentenced nunc pro tunc pursuant to our 
decision in State v. Johnson, 635 P.2d 36, 38 (Utah 
1981), thereby restoring his right to appeal. In 
January 2005, the district court ordered that 
Grimmett be resentenced. Subsequent to the district 
court's resentencing order but prior to the actual 
resentencing, Grimmett filed a motion to withdraw 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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his guilty pleas or, in the alternative, to reduce the 
degrees of the offenses prior to being resentenced. 
The district court denied the motion and instead 
resentenced Grimmett nunc pro tunc, ruling that it 
lacked jurisdiction to consider Grimmett's motion to 
withdraw his pleas. 
*2 f 6 Grimmett filed a timely appeal. He 
subsequently filed a motion with the court of 
appeals asking that it either summarily reverse his 
convictions or order a remand hearing on his claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel under rule 23B 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The court of 
appeals denied the motion and certified the appeal 
for transfer to this court. We have jurisdiction under 
Utah Code section 78-2-2(3)(b). 
ANALYSIS 
*2 f 7 This appeal requires that we determine 
whether a defendant timely files a motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea under Utah Code section 
77-13-6(2)(b) when the motion is filed after the 
district court has ordered that the defendant be 
resentenced but before the actual resentencing. 
Stated differently, the question before us is whether 
the application of the Johnson nunc pro tunc 
resentencing remedy permits a defendant to 
withdraw his guilty pleas under Utah Code section 
77-13-6(2)(b), which requires that a motion to 
withdraw a plea be made before sentencing. We 
conclude that Grimmett's motion to withdraw his 
guilty plea was untimely and thus affirm the district 
court's denial of Grimmett's motion to withdraw. 
*2 [1][2] K 8 Utah Code section 77-13-6(2)(b) 
establishes the filing limitations that govern a 
criminal defendant's right to withdraw a guilty plea. 
These filing limitations are jurisdictional. State v. 
Merrill 2005 UT 34, % 20, 114 P.3d 585. Section 
77-13-6(2)(b) "imposes a jurisdictional bar on 
late-filed motions to withdraw guilty pleas," id. U 
17, and failure to comply with its requirements " 
extinguishes a defendant's right to challenge the 
validity of the guilty plea on appeal," State v. Reyes, 
2002 UT 13, H 3, 40 P.3d 630. Grimmett must 
therefore comply with the requirements of section 
77-13-6(2)(b) if he seeks to challenge the validity of 
his guilty pleas on appeal. See Manning v. State, 
2005 UT 61, H 36, 122 P.3d 628 ("Any challenge 
to [a guilty plea] may only be undertaken following 
a timely motion for withdrawal of the guilty plea."). 
*2 K 9 Grimmett contends that his January 2005 
motion to withdraw his guilty pleas met the 
jurisdictional requirements of section 77-13-6(2)(b), 
despite the fact that it was filed twenty-two months 
after his sentencing. Because section 77-13-6(2)(b) 
underwent substantial revision in May 2003 and the 
parties disagree about which version of the statute 
controls, we review both versions and conclude that 
Grimmett's challenge fails under both. 
I. THE 1989 VERSION OF UTAH CODE 
SECTION 77-13-6(2)(B) 
*2 [3] H 10 The prior version of section 
77-13-6(2)(b), which was first adopted by the 
legislature in 1989 and remained in effect at the 
time of Grimmett's original March 2003 sentencing, 
reads as follows: "A request to withdraw a plea of 
guilty or no contest is made by motion and shall be 
made within 30 days after the entry of the plea " 
(emphasis added). Grimmett's motion, filed almost 
two years after the entry of his guilty plea, clearly 
fails to meet the thirty-day jurisdictional 
requirement of the 1989 statute. Grimmett 
nevertheless argues that we should excuse his 
noncompliance, noting our statement that a " 
presentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
should, in general, be liberally granted." State v. 
Gallegos, 738 P.2d 1040, 1042 (Utah 1987). 
Gallegos is unavailing here, however, for two 
reasons. 
*3 U 11 First, Grimmett's January 2005 motion to 
withdraw was not a "presentence motion," as it was 
filed twenty-two months after the announcement of 
his sentence. Second, and more importantly, we 
made the statement on which Grimmett relies while 
reviewing the 1980 version of section 77-13-6, 
which imposed no jurisdictional time limitations on 
motions to withdraw. That version read: "A plea of 
guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon 
good cause shown and with leave of court." Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-13-6 (1982) (amended 1989 & 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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2003), see also State v Abeyta, 852 P 2d 993, 
994-96 (Utah 1993) (applying the 1980 version of 
the statute and holding that it potentially allowed a 
criminal defendant to withdraw a guilty plea almost 
three years after sentencing) 
*3 T| 12 Section 77-13-6, however, was amended 
by the legislature m 1989 to impose a strict 
jurisdictional time limit Cf Utah Code Ann § 
77-13-6(2)(b) (1995) (amended 2003) ("A request 
to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest is made 
by motion and shall be made withm 30 days after 
the entry of the plea "), see also Abeyta, 852 P 2d at 
995 While courts may still "liberally grant" 
presentence motions to withdraw a guilty plea, they 
may now do so only if they have jurisdiction Under 
the 1989 version of section 77-13-6(2)(b), the 
district court had none 
II THE 2003 VERSION OF UTAH CODE 
SECTION 77-13-6(2)(B) 
*3 f 13 We now consider Gnmmett's arguments 
withm the context of the 2003 version of section 
77-13-6(2)(b) In doing so, we find that the Johnson 
resentencing remedy is limited in nature and 
purpose and does not allow Grimmett "another 
opportunity to present postconviction motions" 
State v Goidon, 913 P 2d 350, 356 (Utah 1996) 
A Background 
*3 K 14 Two months after Gnmmett's original 
March 2003 sentencing, the legislature amended 
section 77-13-6(2)(b) to remove the thirty-day limit 
and instead lequire that criminal defendants file 
withdrawal motions before sentencing As amended, 
the statute reads "A request to withdraw a plea of 
guilty or no contest, except for a plea held m 
abeyance, shall be made by motion before sentence 
is announced Sentence may not be announced 
unless the motion is denied" Utah Code Ann § 
77-13-6(2)(b) (2003) (emphasis added) 
*3 1f 15 The legislature apparently enacted this 
amendment m response to our decision m State v 
Ostlei, 2001 UT 68, 31 P 3d 528 In Ostler, we 
© 2007 Thomson/West No 
Page 4 
interpreted the phrase "30 days after the entry of the 
plea" to lefer to the date of entry of final judgment, 
not to the date of the plea colloquy Id ^ 11 We 
leasoned that substantial unfairness might result 
from a plain-language reading of the 1989 statute " 
[T]o start the time for moving to withdraw a plea 
from the time the district court accepted a plea 
could 'deprive the district court of the power to 
review a plea before it enters a judgment of 
conviction and sentence,' an outcome we found to 
be unreasonably unfair" Merrill, 2005 UT 34, j^ 
16, 114 P3d 585 (quoting Ostler, 2001 UT 68, If 
10, 31 P 3d 528) 
*4 f 16 The 2003 amendment to section 
77-13-6(2)(b) both embraced and repudiated Ostler 
It embraced Ostler's recognition that it would be 
unfair to prevent criminal defendants from moving 
to withdraw a guilty plea at any time before their 
sentencing Cf Utah Code Ann § 77-13-6(2)(b) 
(2003) It repudiated Ostler, however, by setting 
sentencing as the deadline for filing such motions 
Under Ostler, a criminal defendant had thirty days 
from "the date of final disposition of the case" to 
file a motion to withdraw 2001 UT 68, \ 11, 31 
P 3d 528 The 2003 amendment eliminates this 
possibility and instead mandates that any motion to 
withdraw a plea be filed before sentence is 
announced 
B The Limited Nature and Purpose of the Nunc 
Pro Tunc Resentencing Remedy 
*4 [4] 1 17 In Gnmmett's view, the district court's 
January 2005 order that he be resentenced nunc pro 
tunc reopened the section 77-13-6(2)(b) time frame 
and permitted him to file a motion to withdraw at 
any time before the actual resentencing In other 
words, Giimmett reads the term "sentence" m the 
2003 statute as including a "resentence " He thus 
reads the 2003 statute as meaning that "[a] request 
to withdraw a plea of guilty or no contest, except 
for a plea held m abeyance, shall be made by 
motion before sentence [or resentence] is 
announced " We reject this interpretation 
*4 K 18 In State v Johnson, 635 P 2d 36, 38 (Utah 
1981), we instructed distnct courts to resentence 
to Orig U S Govt Woiks 
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criminal defendants nunc pro tunc when those 
defendants were prevented from bringing timely 
appeals through no fault of their own. Under 
Johnson, nunc pro tunc resentencing restarted the 
appeal clock and provided defendants with an 
opportunity to bring direct appeals of their 
convictions. Id. The Johnson nunc pro tunc 
resentencing regime stood until our decision in 
Manning v. State, 2005 UT 61, 122 P.3d 628, 
which was decided about two weeks before 
Grimmett filed his initial brief in this case. 
*4 \ 19 In Manning, we discarded nunc pro tunc 
resentencing in light of the 1996 enactment of the 
PCRA, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-35a-101 to -110 
(2002 & Supp.2006), and corresponding revisions 
to rules 65B and 65C of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. We concluded that "resentencing [was] 
no longer a preferred remedy," in part because " 
resentencing tends to create more problems than it 
resolves." Manning, 2005 UT 61, f 28, 122 P.3d 
628 (internal quotation marks omitted). Indeed, 
Grimmett's case nicely illustrates the problematic 
nature of the Johnson remedy. 
*4 |^ 20 Our opinion in Manning made clear that " 
the Johnson remedy was ultimately designed to 
restore a denied right to appeal." Id. Our decisions 
in both Manning and Johnson were fashioned to 
address a single, key constitutional concern: "[W]e 
must provide a readily accessible and procedurally 
simple method by which persons improperly denied 
their right to appeal can promptly exercise this right. 
" Id. 26; accord Johnson, 635 P.2d at 38 ("[If a] 
defendant was denied a constitutional right [to a 
timely appeal, he] must be provided an opportunity 
to take a direct appeal from his conviction."). 
Johnson and its progeny thus established the limited 
scope and purpose of the nunc pro tunc 
resentencing remedy. 
*5 K 21 Our decision in State v. Gordon, 913 P.2d 
350 (Utah 1996), affirms the limited scope of the 
Johnson remedy. In Gordon, a criminal defendant 
who had been resentenced nunc pro tunc moved for 
a new trial on the grounds of ineffective assistance 
of counsel and newly discovered evidence. Id. at 
353. This court explained that the motion for a new 
trial was untimely: 
*5 The only effect of the [resentencing] order was to 
provide [the defendant] with another opportunity to 
pursue the direct appeal that he was previously 
denied. In other words, [the defendant's] 
resentencing merely returned him to the position he 
was in before his appeal was dismissed. It did not 
allow him another opportunity to present 
postconviction motions. 
*5 Id. at 356 (emphasis added). 
*5 U 22 Gordon relied in part on our decision in 
State v. Hallett, 856 P.2d 1060, 1062 (Utah 1993), 
in which we explained that "[o]nce a trial court on 
habeas review determines that a defendant has been 
denied the constitutional right to appeal, a direct 
appeal should be provided immediately, without 
adjudication of any other claims, such as 
ineffective assistance of counsel" (emphasis added) 
(footnote omitted). Thus, Gordon and Hallett both 
illustrate that nunc pro tunc resentencing is a limited 
remedy designed to reinstate the crucial 
constitutional right to appeal. In both cases, we 
expressly rejected the view that the reinstatement of 
the right to appeal opened the door for the 
consideration of post-conviction motions. 
*5 K 23 The 2003 amendment to section 
77-13-6(2)(b) did not undercut our reasoning in 
Gordon. Under the 1989 statute, a defendant was 
required to move to withdraw his plea "within 30 
days after the entry of the [final judgment]." See 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-13-6(2)(b) (1995) (amended 
2003); see also Ostler, 2001 UT 68, H 11, 31 P.3d 
528. This time frame was changed by the 2003 
statute, which required that the motion be filed " 
before sentence is announced." Utah Code Ann. § 
77-13-6(2)(b) (2003). Though this change is not 
insignificant, it does not render Gordon 
inapplicable. Our holding in Gordon did not hinge 
on the thirty-day deadline imposed by the 1989 
statute; it was based instead on the limited scope 
and purpose of the nunc pro tunc resentencing 
remedy. We fail to see how modification of the 
statutory deadline bears on either the nature or the 
scope of the nunc pro tunc resentencing remedy. 
*5 K 24 We therefore conclude that the district 
court's January 2005 resentencing order did not 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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reopen the filing window established by section 
77-13-6(2)(b). We expressly hold that the Johnson 
nunc pro tunc resentencing remedy, which is no 
longer available to criminal defendants, Manning, 
2005 UT 61, H 11, 122 P.3d 628, does not permit a 
criminal defendant to file a motion to withdraw a 
guilty plea after the jurisdictional deadline 
established by section 77-13-6(2)(b). 
*5 % 25 Because Grimmett's motion to withdraw 
was untimely under both versions of section 
77-13-6(2)(b), we have no jurisdiction to consider 
his challenge to the validity of his guilty pleas. See 
State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13, % 3, 40 P.3d 630 (" 
[B]ecause [the defendant] did not move to withdraw 
his guilty plea within thirty days after the entry of 
the plea, we lack jurisdiction to address [his 
challenge to his guilty plea] on appeal."). 
*6 % 26 Our decision today does not leave 
Grimmett without a remedy, however. Section 
77-13-6(2)(c) (2003) expressly states that an 
untimely challenge to a guilty plea "shall be 
pursued under" the PCRA and rule 65C of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure.FN1 We further note that 
should Grimmett avail himself of this remedy, he 
may be "appointed] counsel on a pro bono basis," 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-35a-109(l) (2002). But see 
Hutchings v. State, 2003 UT 52, f 20, 84 P.3d 
1150 (stating that defendants have "no statutory or 
constitutional right to counsel in a civil petition for 
post-conviction relief). Given the circumstances 
that have led him to this point and the fact that the 
merits of his argument have not yet been addressed, 
Grimmett appears to be a prime candidate to benefit 
from the district court's discretion to appoint 
counsel. 
U 28 Chief Justice DURHAM, Associate Chief 
Justice WILKINS, Justice DURRANT, and Justice 
NEHRING concur in Justice PARRISH's opinion. 
FN1. Grimmett has already petitioned for 
post-conviction relief once, in June 2004. 
The State responded to that petition by " 
erroneously indicat [ing] ... that a 
challenge to defendant's guilty pleas could 
be made on direct appeal through a 23B 
remand hearing." The State has indicated 
in its brief that because of its error, it will " 
not move to dismiss a petition challenging 
the validity of [Grimmett's] pleas as 
successive." 
Utah,2007. 
Grimmett v. State 
. . . p.3d —9 2007 WL 148854 (Utah), 2007 UT 11 
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CONCLUSION 
*6 U 27 We affirm the district court's denial of 
Grimmett's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas and 
hold that the Johnson nunc pro tunc resentencing 
remedy does not permit him a second bite at the 
apple under Utah Code section 77-13-6(2)(b). 
Because Grimmett did not file a timely motion to 
withdraw his guilty pleas, we have no jurisdiction to 
consider his attack on their validity. Affirmed. 
© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
